Bank Specific and Dynamic Determinants †MyAssignmenthelp.com

Question: Discuss about the Bank Specific and Dynamic Determinants. Answer: Introduction: The overall assessment is focused on delivering the changing financial regulations, which has evolved over the period for the banking sector. The assessment also focuses on detecting the current capital based regulatory system that is used for the banking industry has relatively helped in improving the level of business, which is conducted by banks. The significance and effect of the regulations on the operations of the banking system is evaluated, which could relatively help in understanding the systematic risk and returns generated by the banks. The major changes made in capital regulation directly allow banks to conduct adequate business, which is conducted ethically. Evolution of capital regulations is relatively conducted in the assessment, which allows the detection of relevant effects on banking operations. The proposition of capital regulations that has restricted the returns of banks is evaluated in the assessment. Furthermore, the effect of capital regulations on the lendin g process of banks is evaluated post-global financial crisis era. This overall evaluation relatively helps in detecting whether Banking Regulation are Countercyclical. The analysis of banking operations before and after the financial crisis relatively helps in understanding the overall regulations that was conducted on banks. This evaluation of regulatory system would eventually help in understanding the financial condition of banks and their ability to generate revenue from operations. Furthermore, adequate evaluation on capital regulations is conducted with its overall evolution, which regulates Financial Institutions and banks to conduct adequate businesses in the current market. Consider the evolution of capital regulation and the review the current capital based regulatory system and evaluate the effect regulation has had on banking operations, systemic risk, and bank returns: The evolution of capital regulations has effectively conducted over the previous fiscal yes years, where different types of regulations of past to control and the overall systematic risk involved in banking operations. The evolution of the regulation relatively increased or started after the financial crisis, which mainly portrayed the loopholes in the current capital regulation system. Moreover, these economic regulations were held to increase the control on banks that were greedy enough to ignore their capacity and incur more debt than required. Capital regulations has relatively improved from Basel I to Basel III, which relatively helps in reducing the overall occurrence of second financial crisis due to the greediness of banks. The current Basel III regulations are mainly based on the international capital standard for banks, which helps in assessing the different levels of risk involved in investments. Therefore, with the help of Basel III the overall reduction in risk from inve stments are conducted, which was previously not present in the banking regulations. On the contrary, Bruno and Shin (2015) argued that with the implementation of more strict capital regulations banks are still able to increase their operations by acquiring more risk, while increasing the chance of default. Berger et al. (2016) further stated that the control measures conducted on Financial Institutions relatively restrict the banking sector to conduct business, which might directly hamper the overall capital regulation system of the country. The focus of the changes on capital regulations was mainly conducted to increase banks equity capital requirements, which was previously not present and increase the overall risk of the banks. Moreover, the non-fulfillment of relevant just assessment, which was not conducted by Basel I was mainly supported by Basel II. Basel II was mainly used for assessing different types of risk for assets, which relatively helped Bank to reduce their risk from operations and conduct ethical business. However, Basel II was updated to Basel III, which relatively comprised all the regulations that needs to be followed by banks while conducting business. These capital regulations are a reflection of the conclusion that was drawn from financial crisis, where the banks became fragile due to the low capital regulations implemented in their operations. The progress and evolution of the capital regulations was mainly triggered by the financial crisis, where the actual loopholes in the capital regulations i dentified. Hilscher and Raviv (2014) stated that with the implementation of Basel II the overall unethical measures that could be conducted by banks for increasing their profits would reduce substantial, which help in protecting the depositors money in case of cash stagnation. The changes in capital regulations relatively help in improving the overall measures and structure of banks for the period. Before the financial crisis the overall requirements for the banks to hold cash, reserves were relatively low, which boosted the banks to increase their capacity to generate higher Returns. However, after evaluating the mistakes that was conducted during and before the financial crisis adequate changes in the capital standards were conducted. The evolution on the Minimum capital requirements that needs to be followed by the banks to conduct the operation relatively produced the possibility of future financial crisis. The changes in minimum common equity capital, capital conservation buffer, minimum Tier 1 capital, minimum total capital and countercyclical buffer regime was a relatively changed from 2013 to 2018, where the overall projections of the changes are also depicted. This relatively indicates the overall progress evolution on the capital regulations that was imposed on banks post financial crisis. Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) mentioned that with the changes in capital regulations the operations conducted by banks became more prominent and riskless, which eventually help in strengthening the financial sector and minimizing the chance of another financial crisis. The relevant changes in capital standard have been implemented by Basel III, which would eventually help banks to reduce their overall risk. Moreover, the current capital base regulatory system relatively falls under Basel III, Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, which needs to be conducted by banking companies to improve the level returns in comparison to risk. In addition, the method would eventually help in supporting the current capital based regulatory system used by the banks (Jimenez et al. 2014). The implementation of Basel III relatively restricts the banks to go beyond their ability to support their operations for generating high returns. Moreover, Minimum requirements are needed by banks to fulfill conduct business in the presence of capital regulations without which they would not be provided with the license to continue their operations. The minimum regulation is mainly implemented by Basel III, which is continuously changing to Increase new safety and soundness regulation such as new standards for capital and advantage of banks (Dell'Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez 2017). The evolution in minimum capital requirements relatively portrays the changing perception of policymakers regarding the financial stability risk of those, which could hamper operations of the bank. The current capital regulations are to minimize this is taking capability of banks, as previously it leads to the financial crisis and cash stagnation. The regulations imposed on the banking system have relatively affected their operational capability, while changing the systematic risk and return that it could generate from operations. The restrictions laid down by the capital regulatory system has mainly reduced the overall operational capability of banks, which directly helps in reducing the risk involved in operations. The systematic risk is mainly incurred due to the decision that is made by banks onto the relevant Investments, which were relatively increases when banks tend to increase the accumulation of risk to generate higher returns. The current capital based regulatory system has a relatively helped and improving the operations of the bank while reducing systematic risk (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong 2016). Banks now provide loans with a proper Understanding of the disk attributes that is in Gulf in providing loans to a certain individual. This relatively helps in reducing the overall chances of cash stagnation and losses fr om operations. The capital regulatory system has been the minimizing the banking operations to the level which was needed to sustain the financial market. However, this relatively reduced the systematic risk for the banking sector, while declining its actual Returns. The main problems that occurred with the implementation of capital regulatory systems were the production in returns generated by banks. Banks were not able to increase their systematic risk to generate high returns, which reduced the profits generated by banks. In this context, Dell?Ariccia, Laeven and Marquez (2014) stated that with low systematic risk banks could adequately their operations in the financial market, while reducing the chances of cash stagnation the current regulations are still evolving to support the overall banking system, while reducing their high risk-taking capability. Therefore, more changes in the minimum requirement capital and other attributes laid down by Basel III are being conducted improve the banking system. The overall systematic risk involved in operations of the bank has a relatively reduced after the financial crisis, where the banks provided loans to anyone for increasing the returns on investment. The slow systematic risk has a relatively reduce d the return generation capacity of banks in the current era. Evaluate the proposition that capital regulations have restricted return and whether regulation is reduced to the operations of banks: There are many reasons behind the restriction that is imposed by capital regulations on banks, as it directly helps in reducing the problems that might arise in future. There are segmented reasons behind the need of adequate regulations for controlling banks or they might conduct operations to generate higher returns from investment. There were significant habits of the Banks, which would be identified as the most problematic condition faced by capital regulator. From the evaluation, it could be detected that banks have a tendency to take on higher risk for achieving or enhancing their profits, which relatively increases the risk from investment. Without regulations, banks would only focus on creating enhancing the profit while taking on more risk with the capital that is provided by depositors. Moreover, the regulation also imposed due to the private incentive that is made by bankers for conducting operations. The bankers tend to increase the compensation and incentives, while condu cting business, which is not adequate according to the regulations. Likewise, the bank use clients money to generate profits, which relatively increases their capacity for risk, as the investment capital is of depositors. Flannery (2016) criticizes that the problems faced by regulators, in controlling the banking regulations and operations, is persisting, which relatively increases the chance of another financial crisis. Furthermore, the sophisticated products that are sold by the banks to the customers have relevant knowledge gap, which relatively favors the bank. Measure was a relatively scene during the financial crisis, when the faulty CDOs were transferred from banks to investors without the prior knowledge. Besides, the externalities make banking a very sensitive business, as a failure of bank would eventually affect the whole economy due to its operations tangled all around the economy. These are the main reasons behind the restrictions that need to import on banking before t he conduct adequate business in the economy (Berg and Kaserer 2015). The current propositions of capital regulations that have been imposed on banks have adequately restricted them to conduct risky business. Implementation of Basel II and Basel III Accord has relatively regulated the banking system while imposing different restrictions on them to conduct business. On the other hand, Khan, M.S., Scheule and Wu (2017) criticizes that potential negative ramification can be conducted if restrictions on the Banking Regulation increases, as it might directly transfer into a regulated Shadow banking system. This regulated Shadow banking system would eventually hamper the economic condition and increase the operations in black market. Therefore, it could be indicated that the current capital regulations that is imposed on operations of Banks is relatively adequate as it helps in reducing the additional risk that might be accumulated by banks (Baker and Wurgler 2015). The overall implementation of macro prudential regulations that is conducted on banks relatively increases the restrictions of activities that need to be ignored by the banks. Moreover, the restrictions or preventions that are imposed on banks are a measure that is conducted on a day-to-day control basis for resolving any kind of crisis, which might incur in future. Additionally, the activity restrictions are conducted where the authorities directly limit The Financial Institutions actions that could be taken by them. The overall Glass Steagall Act listed in 1933 mainly sliced the investment banks and commercial banks, which helped in segregating the operations of the bank and the capability to lend to an individual borrow. the restrictions on the lending process relatively post the banks to not increase the amount of loan more than 10% of the banks overall assets for an individual borrower. Acharya and Steffen (2015) argued that the overall increment in regulations has mainly reduce d the operation capability of banks, while the risk involved in investments is still high, which might in turn hamper depositors money. This restriction relatively allowed the banks to reduce the overall risk from investment is restricting the loan amount for an individual investor. Likewise, restrictions imposed by the capitol regulators are only on risk that can be accumulated by banks for conducting operations. The restrictions of how much are just a bank antique is conducted by limiting the advantage of the particular Bank. In addition, banks for reducing the overall risk and advantage from operations needs to increase higher capital accumulation (Bougatef and Mgadmi 2016). The capital regulations have mainly indicated the criteria for capital that need to be implemented by banks, where changes in capital need to be conducted for improving its protection. Moreover, the restrictions on banks relatively allow the creditors protection in case the bank default and is not able to provide the overall loan amount. This restriction directly changes the overall perspective of banks in conducting business, which in Limit their capability to conduct business according to that its attributes. After evaluating the capital regulations restrictions on the operations of banks could be identified, this is conducted with the help of Basel II and Basel III accord (Gersbach and Rochet 2017). The restrictions are mainly based on the overall return and risk attribute of the capital regulations, which relatively reduces the overall capability of the banks to minimize risk from operations. The capital regulations are only imposed on banks for regulating their operations accord ing to the measures, which might help in reducing the accumulation of excessive systematic risk within its operations. The restrictions relatively reduce the advantage condition of banks while conducting the business, which helps in safeguarding the overall depositors money, which is used by banks in conducting business. The legislation that is currently present relatively allows banks to use depositors money for conducting business without the consequence of loss. However, the restrictions of capital regulations relatively minimize the chance of loss that might in curve by the banks due to gas stagnation. The measures depicted in Basel III relatively increase the minimum requirements of capital that needs to be present within the operations of bank to conduct smooth operations (Gambacorta and Shin 2016). Therefore, the restrictions conducted on bank has a relatively reduced their overall operations,which reduces financial operations of banks. The restrictions are mainly based on the operations which increases risk attributes of the bank, which in turn helps in securing the depositors money. Moreover, the restrictions depicted by regulations mainly decline the overall operations such as providing loans to individuals and groups. This restriction relevantly reduces the capability of bank for issuing the entire loan to one individual (Faccio, Marchica, and Mura 2016). Furthermore, the preposition of increasing the relevant restriction on the operations of bank is conducted, where the minimum Capital requirement increased every year to reduce the substantial risk involved in the banking system. Besides, the input of capital conversion buffer has relatively helped in maintaining the level of adequate capital within the banking system. The minimum Tier 1 capital required for the operations has a relatively increased over the period, which restricts banks to conduct the business. The minimum total Capital requirement has also increased with the minimum common equity that needs to be maintained by banks in their financial records. This restrictions and Minimum requirements that is imposed on banks buy capital regulations has a relatively reduce the capability of bank to conduct operations (Hugonnier and Morellec 2017). Analyse the effect of capital regulation has had on lending in the post global crisis era and banking regulations countercyclical: The relevant evaluation of the capital regulations on lending process of banking sector could be identified by evaluating the post and pre-lending conditions of banks. Before the financial crisis, the overall lending process of banks was relatively different, as their focus was to maximize their profits from investment. The banks would eventually provide loans to everyone whoever would approach them for a particular loan without collateral or income proof. This was mainly conducted to initiate loan with higher interest rate, which could provide rising profits for the banking system. However, the lending process had relatively different types of flowers, which was identified after the financial crisis. In this context, Schepens (2016) stated that banks provided bad loans to individuals and accumulated the loans on a particular Bond known as CDOs, which led to the decline of image of financial sectors all around the world. The valuation of bonds was relatively conducted based on credit ratings, which was always high regardless of risk and return attributes of the instrument. On the other hand, Bessis (2015) argued that banks due to the availability of capital from the market were conducting unethical measure to increase the returns from investment by transferring the loans from them to the investors. However, the current lending process is mainly restricted by the capital regulations imposed on banks, which substantially reduces the risk from Investments. The restrictions on the lending process have relatively increased with background checks and thorough income tax of borrowers is conducted before issuing loans. This measure was relatively imposed on the banking system after the financial crisis, which relatively helped in improving the current financial position of banks. However, the banks previously would never check the actual background and income proof of the individuals getting the loans. On the contrary, Paligorova and Santos (2017) argued that banks were able to manipulate the risk attributes due to the lack of adequate regulations and monitoring conducted on their operations. Therefore, the current banking system mainly neglects all the measures that were taken pre-financial crisis, which reduces the overall risk attributes of the operations conducted by banks. After the financial crisis Basel accord was mainly changed and updated to Basel III, which relevantly has three main pillars such as minimum Capital requirement, risk management supervision, and market discipline (Nguyen 2014). These three pillars mainly help in evaluating the Minimum Requirements That needs to be followed by banks before initiating the learning process. This relatively minimizes the capability of the banks in issuing loans to borrow without conducting adequate research and evaluation. With implementation of the three pillars, there are different attributes of Basel III, which needs to be followed by banks such as capital base, risk coverage, advantage ratio, and capital buffers. With implementation of above attributes, the oral bank is relatively restricted to conduct adequate evaluation before providing loans to the borrower. Moreover, the lending supervision act relatively provides Basel III to force capital requirements on banks, which helps in reducing the exce ssive Risk that could be taken by banking institutions (Mollah et al. 2017). Moreover, the capital regulations authority, which could help in improving the risk, has changed the lending process that was used by banks before the financial crisis and return attributes of the banking sector. Currently banks need adequate proof from the borrower regarding the income and property that is we mortgage for the loan. In addition, the credit ratings of borrowers are also evaluated before providing them any kind of loan, as it helps in identifying the capability to return the borrowed money. Furthermore, the implementation of adequate measure conducted by capital regulator's eventually help improve the banking sector and reduce the negative impact of systematic risk (Mankai and Belgacem 2016). With the lending process, the overall conversion of loans from banks to investors is also regulated by the capital activities. previously the banks for conducting unethical measures by ranking B+ bonds as AAA and selling them to investors. The regulations after the financial crisis has a relatively frequent the bond valuation system, which is been used to evaluate the mortgage bonds in the current era. Moreover, the banks are not able to convert all its loans to Bond and transfer them to potential investors. This restrictions on transfer of loans has a relatively restricted the lending process of banks, as after providing the loans the bank needs to hold them on books and not transfer them in the capital market (Efing et al. 2015). Bushman, Hendricks and Williams (2016) argued that the overall financial banks were regulated to minimize the risk that they could undertake from operations, which might hamper the actual depositorys money. In addition, the Basel III accord mainly helps in reducing the overall risk from investment, which could be generated by banks after the financial crisis. The current banking regulations are also not countercyclical, as the overall countercyclical buffer regime is introduced in Basel III. This buffer regime is mainly introduced to counter the overall pro-cyclical measures, which is conducted by banks during a favorable economic condition. During the economic boom banks, tend to provide loans to individuals for increasing their profits, whereas the lack of good borrowers relatively increases their thirst for providing loans to anyone. This increases the risk attributes of the banking system, which was previously conducted before the financial crisis. The banks were trying to provide loans to individuals with no credibility based on property (Waemustafa and Sukri 2015). This increases the chance of pro-cyclical, which relatively increases the risk of operations that is conducted by banks. However, in Basel III countercyclical buffer regime directly allows the banks to retain adequate profits in their business for improving their financia l stability. The overall measure has a relatively increased over the period after its introduction in 2016. The banks are mainly forced to retain decent share of profit and built-up reserves for reducing the negative impact from any financial crisis. Plantin (2014) criticizes that the reduction in banks capability to provide loans would eventually hamper the economic condition of the country, where businesses would not get adequate support from banks to conduct their operations. Conclusion: The oral assessment was mainly conducted to identify the capital regulations, which was imposed on banking after the financial crisis. There were different levels of changes and evolution witnessed within the capital regulations, which help in reducing the overall risk attributes of banks. Moreover, the capital regulations measures that were taken to control the risk attributes of banks also restricted them to conduct business freely. These restrictions relatively reduced the capability of banks to increase the returns from investment, as higher risk resulted in higher returns. The aim of capital regulations was to understand the banking structure and lay down the relevant rules to restrict the risk-taking capability of banks. Besides, the analysis of continuous restrictions on banking operations and risk is evaluated in the assessment. This analysis helps in identifying the current restrictions that is implemented by Basel III on the operations of banks to reduce the risk from investment. The restrictions is a relatively reducing the capability of banks to continue with its operations freely, while it improves the core operational capability of the banking system. Relevant evaluation of capital regulations on lending process of banks after the Global crisis is evaluated, which is relatively helps in understanding the current capability of banks in issuing loans. The regulations have relatively restricted the lending conditions of banks, while reducing their capability to conduct business. 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